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I am very grateful to Daniel Dennett for 
granting us permission to publish his review 
of Sam Harris’ book Free Will, already avail-
able online, in this volume of the Rivista in-
ternazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia.  
This text deserves to be presented to our 
readership as an autonomous essay, inde-
pendently of Harris’ reply, first of all because 
it offers a clear and concise summary of the 
kernel of Dennett’s compatibilist view on the 
relationship between free will and determin-
ism. (Of course, if Harris would be willing to 
send us a further reply to this essay, we would 
be glad and honored to publish it in one of 
the next volumes.) Secondly, this reissue of 
Dennett’s paper gave us the opportunity to 
ask other scholars for comment. In fact, 
Dennett’s review is followed by four com-
ments authored by Mario De Caro, Andrea 
Lavazza, John Lemos and Derk Pereboom 
who are well known for having published, 
among others, major works on free will. On 
behalf of the editorial board of the Journal, I 
would like to express our gratitude and appre-
ciation to these scholars. Finally, Dennett re-
plied to their comments in a short but dense 
final note. For this, we thank him once again. 
The review together with the comments 
offers a concise and precise overview of the 
various solutions developed by philosophers 
– also in response to recent developments in 
neuroscience – to the issue of whether the 
existence of free will, as the ground for moral 
and juridical responsibility, is compatible 
with a scientific world-view. In particular, 
the question they address is whether free will 
is compatible with the hypothesis that all 
events – including our voluntary actions – 
happen in accordance with the strictly de-
terministic laws of nature. 
Among the incompatibilists, the libertari-
ans argue for the existence of free will and 
deny that the laws of nature determine all 
events, including what we decide to do based 
on our own free will. The hard determinists 
(or illusionists) think, on the contrary, that 
the laws of nature determine everything that 
happens and that therefore free will is an illu-
sion. For their part, the compatibilists go 
back to Hume’s concept of “liberty of spon-
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taneity” and believe that the existence of free 
will is compatible with universal determin-
ism: even though determinism is true, human 
beings act freely when their actions are not de-
termined by external causes, but by their own 
decisions, which depend in turn on their per-
sonality (and thus, ultimately, on the activity 
of their brain which is shaped by their genetic 
heritage and by all their past experiences). 
Following other well-known essays he has 
written on the topic, in his review and reply 
Dennett again raises his compatibilist stance 
in an original form. He maintains that liber-
tarians and hard determinists fall into a 
common mistake of Cartesian origin which 
consists in believing that we act freely only if 
it is not our brain that makes us do what we 
do. To both he raises the objection that: «[if 
you say] “my brain made me do it!” Well of 
course it did, but it is not something external 
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to you, but rather a part of you». 
The commentators take different stands on 
this issue. Mario De Caro shares the very same 
perspective as Dennett; Andrea Lavazza argues 
for a view that is, in part, similar to Dennett’s; 
John Lemos defends a libertarian position; in 
contrast, Derk Pereboom distances himself 
from Dennett and argues for a thesis that – 
standing in opposition to both compatibilism 
and libertarianism – is inclined towards hard 
determinism. Thus, taken together these works 
cover quite well all the options in play in the 
debate on whether free will is or is not compat-
ible with determinism. Of course, as becomes 
clear looking at the large bibliography Dennett 
and his commentators refer to, the philosophi-
cal and scientific debate on free will is wide-
ranging and these pages cannot account for the 
full range of positions. However, they will cer-
tainly stimulate reflection and further reading. 
 
